Abstract. Remote presence systems that allow remote operators to physically move around the world, observe it, and, in some cases, manipulate it, introduce a new set of privacy concerns. Traditional telepresence systems allow remote users to passively observe, forcing them to look at whatever the camera is pointing at. If we want something to remain private, then we simply do not put it in front of the camera. Remote presence systems, on the other hand, allow active observation, and put the control of the camera in the hands of the remote operator. They can drive around, and look at the world from different viewpoints, which complicates privacy protection. In this paper, we look at how we can establish privacy protections for remote presence systems by manipulating the video data sent back to them. We evaluate a number of manipulations of these data, balancing privacy protection against the ability to perform a given task, and report on the results of two studies that attempt to evaluate these techniques.
the camera in the hands of the remote operator. They can drive around, and look at the world from different viewpoints, which complicates privacy protection. Fig. 1 . Three privacy-protecting image manipulations. Top: replacement ("can't tell"); Middle: redaction ("can't observe"); Bottom: blurring ("can't discern").
In this paper, we look at how we can establish privacy protections for remote presence systems by manipulating the video data sent back to them, and present two studies to evaluate how well these protections work. We consider a number of manipulations of these data, illustrated in figure 1, obscuring or removing objects in the environment that we wish to remain private, while retaining enough information to allow the remote operator to perform their task.
Defining Privacy
For the purposes of this paper, we define a privacy type to be a specific restriction on the capabilities of the remote presence system. The capabilities can either be physical, where the system is prevented from taking some action or movement, or observational, where the sensor data transmitted to the remote user are altered in some way. In this paper, we limit ourselves to observational privacy, and to a video stream, although the basic ideas we discuss generalize to other sensor modalities.
We consider three types of observational privacy. Can't tell privacy is the expectation that the remote operator cannot tell if a particular object is there or not. Examples include not noticing any items exist on a table, or being unable to tell that there is a person present in the room. Can't observe privacy is the expectation that the remote operator might be able to tell there is something there, but cannot directly perceive it. Examples include not being able to look into a certain room, not being able to identify a shape as a person, or not showing what types of objects are on a table. Finally, can't discern privacy is the expectation that the remote operator can tell that there is something there and can identify the class of the object, but not the particular instance. Examples include being unable to read the text of documents on the table, being unable to make out facial features, or being unable to make out details of pictures on the walls. the robotics literature. However, there is a rich history of video manipulation in the graphics literature.
Broadly speaking, we classify manipulation of images and video by how they change the image: blur, inpainting, abstraction, line drawings, and painterly rendering. Blurring is a straightforward image filter and is commonly used in TV to obscure people's faces. Inpainting [3, 9] allows for filling an area of an image with synthesized content that is ideally indistinguishable from its environment. Abstraction, also sometimes called image stylization [18, 12] , is similar to blurring, in that details are elided, but it differs in that strong edges are preserved. It can also involve restricting the color palate to create a cartoon-like effect. Since these are essentially texture filters, most methods can be efficiently implemented on a GPU. Line drawings [7] similarly preserve edges, but eliminate color information and render the result as a pen and ink or pencil-style sketch (sometimes with shading represented as hatching [16] ). Painterly rendering techniques try to mimic a particular style, such as pixelation [8] , oil or watercolors [11, 13] and comic-style [14] . Although not always intentional, most of these techniques also result in some image simplification or loss of detail, especially with large brush sizes.
Various studies have looked into how using video manipulations may help uphold privacy. Specifically, privacy typically considers autonomy, confidentiality, and solitude [5] . Filtering out parts of an image through marker detection has been shown to effectively uphold privacy for video surveillance cameras [15] . With an always-on camera space, using a blur filter has been shown to better balance protecting one's privacy while still allowing sufficient awareness to the user, so that any necessary and relevant information may still be gleaned from the image both with a co-present media space [10] and a telepresent media space [4] . However, in some circumstances where the privacy concerns are greater (i.e. assistive monitoring through use of a fixed always-on camera), a blur filter may not be sufficient, and another technique such as redaction may work more effectively [6] .
Protecting Privacy with Video Manipulation
In this study we tested how well the different video manipulation techniques worked for each of the different privacy types, using three different scenarios. To avoid issues with localization, tracking, and training users to drive the robot, we conducted this study with videos recorded from the camera of a TurtleBot 2 robot driven by an experienced user. Care was taken to ensure that all objects relevant to the tasks were clearly visible at some point during the videos.
Participants were asked to watch three short video clips that were captured by a robot exploring an office environment, and to respond to five questions asking them to identify objects within the environment. Each scene had a specific privacy type applied to it, and participants viewed one clip of each scene. Each clip had one of the five randomly assigned video manipulations applied to it. 140 participants were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk service, and compensated between US$0.20 and US$0.40 for their time. Participants were told that they would be expected to "watch a clip from the perspective of a robot investigating an office and answer 5 short questions." The study took between three and five minutes for participants to complete.
To give some context to the study, we recorded video corresponding to three scenarios to present to the participants. Each scenario had a privacy type and a set questions to determine if there was a privacy violation associated with it.
In the valuables scenario, the robot drives through an office environment in which valuable electronics, such as a tablet computer are visible. We assign a "can't tell" privacy type to this scenario, since we do not want the remote user to be able to tell if there are valuables present. The participant was asked "How many computers or electronic valuables (costing more than $50) are there in the room?" and "Name the valuables and the their locations in the room." A privacy violation occurs each time a piece of electronics is correctly identified by a participant.
In the hallway scenario, the robot passes an open doorway looking out into a hallway in which there is a large cardboard box. We assign a "can't observe" privacy type to this scenario, since we do not want the remote user to be able to see anything outside of the room. The participant was asked "Could you see anything in the hallway? If so, please list anything that you saw." A privacy violation occurs if the participant notices anything in the hallway (even if they cannot identify it).
Finally, in the bookshelf scenario, the robot passes a bookshelf with a number of books on it. A "can't discern" privacy type was assigned to this scenario, because we do not want to reveal the identities of some of the books on the shelf. The participant was asked "How many books are on the bookshelf?" and "Name as many titles of the books as you can." A privacy violation occurs each time a private book title is successfully identified by the participant.
We had five video manipulation conditions for this study: redact (replace object or area with black pixels); replace (replace object or area with background pixels); abstract (replace object or area with abstraction); blur (apply a blur filter to the object or area); and control (no manupulation).
Each manipulation was applied to each video clip by hand, off-line, using Adobe After Effects R . While this is not a viable approach for autonomously protecting privacy, it ensured that the video manipulations we tested in this study were free from artifacts introduced by poor object recognition or localization.
Participants were shown one video clip from each scenario, with a randomlyselected video manipulation technique. After each clip, they were presented with the clip-specific questions to determine if a privacy violation had occurred. The resulting data were hand-coded by a pair of researchers to establish the number of privacy violations in each experiment. Figure 2 shows the results of the study. In the "can't tell" scenario (valuables), the abstraction and blurring manipulations had little effect on the number of privacy violations, but redaction and replacement significantly reduced them (see table 4 In the "can't observe" (hallway) scenario, all of the video manipulations led to a significant reduction in the number of privacy violations. However, the redact and replace manipulations resulted in significantly fewer violations than the abstraction and blurring manipulations, both reducing the number of violations to zero.
Results
There are still a number of privacy violations for both the redaction and replacement manipulations, the two techniques which performed best in this scenario. We attribute this to participants being able to identify valuables from their surrounding context: laptops have power cords, for example. This raises an interesting question when performing video manipulations, since we have to not only manipulate based on the content of the image (a representation of the object to be made private), but also on the context surrounding that object. This context can be both physical, like a power cord, or semantic (a redacted object directly under a television is likely to be valuable).
We believe that the replacement video manipulation best protects privacy in this scenario, since participants never made mentioned that they noticed something removed from the video in this condition. Conversely, when using the redaction video condition, it was obvious from some responses that the black boxes alerted the participant that something was there, even if it was unclear what that object was. A snippet from a typical response exemplifies this prob- lem: "it looked like 2 laptops on chairs blocked by black squares." However, we concede that a realistic autonomous replacement filter is significantly harder to implement than a redaction filter.
In the "can't discern" (bookshelf) scenario, it was often difficult for the participants to read the titles of the books, even in the control (unaltered) video condition, due to a lack of resolution in the video. Applying the abstraction manipulation did not seem to affect this much. However, the other three manipulations significantly reduced the number of privacy violations to less than 10% (blur) and zero (redact and replace).
Neither the abstraction nor the blur manipulation had a significant effect on the number of books that the participants counted. However, the redact and replace manipulations caused participants to report significantly fewer books on the shelf than the control condition. This is not a problem, though, since it is, in a sense, providing more privacy than is needed, up to the "can't tell" level.
Effects on Task Performance
The study described in section 4 shows that video manipulation techniques can be used to protect privacy when using a remote presence system. However, such protections are only useful if they do not interfere with the task that the remote operator is trying to accomplish. In this section, we describe a second study, designed to test how much our privacy-protecting measures get in the way as a remote user tries to control the remote presence system.
Participants were asked to teleoperate a mobile robot through an unfamiliar home environment, shown in figure 5 , and to respond to a brief set of survey questions asking them to identify cleaning supplies and equipment contained in the home. 30 participants were recruited through flyers distributed via email and posted on bulletin boards in the local community. Participants were compensated US$10 for their participation. Participants were told that they would be expected to, "drive a robot around an apartment and answer a brief set of survey questions." The average time spent per participant, including training and answering all survey questions, was between 30 and 45 minutes.
Basic demographic information was collected for each participant. 12 males and 18 females participated in the study. The mean age of the participants was 28. 33% of the participants were students, and 30% of the participants played video games more than once a month. Only one of the participants reported any familiarity with the apartment building in which the home environment was staged, and zero expressed an expert level of familiarity with robots or other remotely operated devices. This study had two conditions: one in which privacy protections (experimental) were implemented, and one in which they were not (control). In the experimental condition, a replacement manipulation was applied to all child-related toys in the environment, to enforce a "can't tell" privacy type. A redaction manipulation was applied to video from the bedroom, to enforce a "can't observe" privacy protection, and images on family photographs were blurred to enforce a "can't discern" protection.
Since the robot was being controlled by the participant, all of our video manipulation techniques depended heavily on highly accurate localization of the robot. In order to know which parts of the image to manipulate, we need to know both the pose of the robot and the pose of the objects to be made private. Any localization errors would render our video manipulation techniques useless. In our initial testing, we found that it was impossible to reliably get a pose estimate from the TurtleBot that was good enough for our purposes.
To circumvent this problem, we chose to simulate the video manipulations physically. Replacement was simulated by simply removing the objects from the environment. Redaction was accomplished by hanging a matte black sheet in the bedroom doorway. Blurring was simulated by physically replacing the photographs with pre-blurred versions of themselves. This allowed us to test whether the manipulations themselves are effective, separate from testing whether a particular implementation of the manipulation works. However, for a practical implementation of our techniques, robust, accurate localization remains key, as we discuss in section 6.
Participants were asked to teleoperate a TurtleBot 2 robot through an unfamiliar home environment, using a PS3 game controller. Participants sat at a table with two laptops. One laptop showed a full screen live video feed from the robot. The other laptop was used for displaying a web page that provided instructions to the participant and allowed them to answer the survey questions. The participants were provided with a hand-drawn floor plan of the apartment that they would be moving the robot through, but they were never allowed to see this space with their own eyes. They only observed the space through the video feed from the robot.
Before the experiment began, participants were given a brief training session on teleoperating the TurtleBot, to ensure that they were comfortable controlling it with the game controller. Once this training was completed, the participants were instructed to drive around the environment and identify all of the cleaning supplies that were present.
Participants were then asked to navigate first to the kitchen and then to the living room, and to identify any cleaning supplies and equipment that they found there, including their specific locations and brand names. The number of cleaning supplies correctly identified is our metric for task performance; more supplies identified correlates with better performance on the task.
After completing this task, the participant was asked the following question: "Based on what you saw, to what degree do you agree with the following statement: Children regularly visit this apartment.," and asked to rank their response on a 5-point Likert scale, from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Our goal with this scenario was to render private all signs of children in the environment. A response of "strongly agree" would correlate with a privacy violation, while a response of "strongly disagree" would correlate with good privacy protection. Figure 5 .1 shows the results of the second study. There was no significant difference in the numbers of cleaning products identified across the two conditions (Fisher's exact test, p = 0.763). We interpret this to mean that the privacy protections did not interfere with task performance. However, there was a significant difference in the responses to the question about presence of children across the conditions. Participants in the control condition agree significantly more with the statement "Children regularly visit this apartment" than do participants in the experimental condition (Welch's unequal variances t-test, p < 0.001). We interpret this to mean that our privacy protections were effective.
Results
Clearly, these are best-case results; our physical manipulations were simulations of the computational manipulations that we would, ideally, perform on the video streams from the robot. Removing items to simulate a replacement manipulation, for example, will clearly remove evidence of children. However, we believe that the physical redaction and blurring manipulations do tell us something about the potential utility of performing computational manipulations, assuming that we can get them right. This is, of course, the crux of the problem and hinges on a number of engineering details such as accurate object tracking and robot localization. We are, however, encouraged by these initial results.
Using the privacy-protecting manipulations led to fewer privacy violations in this study. However, the effect may be even more pronounced than the results above suggest. Of the 15 participants in the control condition, only 3 disagreed with the statement that children regularly visited the apartment. Interestingly, 2 of these participants seem to have clicked the wrong button; when asked to justify their answer in the questionnaire, they gave reasons such as "stroller in the kitchen, toys in the living room." Similarly, the one and only participant in the experimental group that agreed with the statement did so because, "The apartment is really clean, I could not see any family pictures or toys around," suggesting that they, in fact, disagreed with the statement.
Conclusions
We have presented results from two studies that demonstrate it is possible to protect privacy by using video manipulation techniques (section 4), and that these techniques can be applied without affecting task performance in a visual observation task (section 5). While these results are preliminary, and rely heavily on simulations to overcome current shortcomings with robot localization and object pose estimation, we believe that they are very encouraging.
The studies in this paper used a number of tricks to overcome poor pose estimation for both the robot and objects in the world. If these techniques are ever to be applied to a real system, then these shortcomings must be addressed. We need to be able to localize the robot accurately with respect to the objects and areas to be made private. If we cannot do this, then our video manipulations might not completely cover the areas of the image corresponding to the object, causing the privacy protections to fail. Alternatively, we might have to manipulate much larger areas of the image, to account for the uncertainty, running the risk of leaving too little information to perform the task at hand. We are currently working on this issue, to assess the trade-offs that will undoubtedly have to be made.
